Documentation

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The Democratic Republic of the Congo[b] (DRC), also known as the DR Congo, Congo-Kinshasa, or simply the Congo, is a country in Central Africa. By land area, the country is the second-largest country in Africa and the 11th-largest in the world.  

With a population of around 111 million, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the most populous nominally Francophone country in the world. The national capital and largest city is Kinshasa, which is also the economic center.  

The country is bordered by the Republic of the Congo; Central African Republic; South Sudan; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Tanzania (across Lake Tanganyika); Zambia; Angola; the Cabinda exclave of Angola; and the South Atlantic Ocean.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a multilingual country where an estimated total of 242 languages are spoken. Ethnologue lists 215 living languages.

The official language, since the colonial period, is French, one of the languages of Belgium.

Four other languages, all of them Bantu-based, have the status of national language: Kikongo-Kituba, Lingala, Swahili, and Tshiluba.

The oil sector accounts for about half of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and 80% of its exports, making it the third largest producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the main source of income is its mineral deposits.

The main cash crops include coffee, palm oil, rubber, cotton, sugar, tea and cocoa. Food crops also include cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and rice.

The country is considered one of the 17 megadiverse nations and is one of the most flora-rich countries on the African continent.

Its rainforests harbor many rare and endemic species, such as the chimpanzee and the bonobo.

It is home to more than 10,000 types of plants, 600 timber species, as well as 1,000 bird species, 280 reptile species, and 400 mammal species, including the forest elephant, gorilla, forest buffalo, bongo, and okapi. Many of these wildlife species are threatened animals such as large lowland gorillas and chimpanzees. However, the decades-long conflict over minerals is where the mountain gorilla has had its habitat.

They live in two isolated groups – one in the Virunga volcanoes – spanning the borders of Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and one in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda, contiguous with DRC's Sarambwe Nature Reserve.

These mountain gorillas are second on the WWF list of most endangered animals.

On this page, you can see the species living in North Kivu.

Rwanda has invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo two times.

The First Congo War was a civil and international military conflict that lasted from October 24, 1996 to May 16 1997, primarily taking place in what was then Zaire.

The war began when Rwanda invaded eastern Zaire to target rebel groups that had sought refuge there. This invasion expanded as Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Eritrea joined, while an anti-Mobutu coalition of Congolese rebels formed. The war resulted in the overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who was replaced by rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila.  After Mobutu's ousting, Kabila renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Kabila had a unstable regime as he sought to distance himself from his former Rwandan and Ugandan backers. He expelled foreign troops and forged alliances with regional powers such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. These actions prompted Rwanda and Uganda to invade te country again, triggering the Second Congo War in 1998.

Some historians and analysts view the First and Second Congo Wars as part of a continuous conflict with lasting effects that continue to affect the region today. However, Paul Kagame began to play a role in the Second Congo War after he was elected in 1998 to succeed Kanyarengwe as chairman of the RPF party,

Unlike Rwanda's politics of defense from before 2004, those emerging after that year showed similarities to the way the Israelis defend themselves politically.

Israelis exploiting the holocaust to silence critics in Europe and to deflect attention away from the genocide of  Palestinians in 1948. Kagame, who is a Tutsi, exploits the genocide against the Tutsis to defend his actions and to deflect attention away from the existence of a second genocide that targeted the Hutus.

The Israeli political language is hasbara, that characterize as gross exaggeration and describing details that either were not that dramatic or did not occur or even do not exist. Kagame speaks a similar language.

The Israelis contineously accuse the Palestinians of having done or not having done this or that while it was or is an act or action by the Israelis themselves. Kagame behaves likewise.

Kagame is stealing the mineral wealth that belongs to the state of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Israelis are stealing the gas wealth off the coast of Gaza that belongs to the State Of Palestine.

Rwanda is the 'Israel of Africa'.

The Rwandan genocide, also known as the genocide against the Tutsi, occurred from April 7, 1994 to July 19,1994, during the Rwandan Civil War. Over a span of around 100 days, members of the Tutsi ethnic group, as well as some moderate Hutu and Twa, were systematically killed by Hutu militias. While the Rwandan Constitution states that over 1 million people were killed, most scholarly estimates suggest between 500,000 and 662,000 Tutsi died. The genocide was marked by extreme violence, with victims often murdered by neighbors, and widespread sexual violence, with between 250,000 and 500,000 women raped.

The story of the genocide has been told in the world's press, in books and in movies such as "Hotel Rwanda." But the subsequent slaughter of Hutus in neighboring Congo is little known, and its perpetrators never have been brought to justice. The discovery of mass graves prompted investigations that led to a controversial U.N. report published on Oct. 1, which accuses invading Rwandan troops of killing tens of thousands of Hutus in 1996 and 1997.

The second genocide became revealed after a mass grave at a banana plantation was found. Further iinvestigation have led to the finding of two more mass graves in the area of Musekera in North Kivu.

In the wake of the discovery of three mass graves in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in late 2005, the United Nations first announced its intention to send a human rights team to conduct a mapping exercise in DRC in a June 2006 report to the Security Council. In May 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon approved the terms of reference of the mapping exercise following a series of consultations among relevant UN agencies and partners and with the Congolese government. Here are some interesting findings:

• Between June and December 1999, UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Forces) and APC soldiers killed an unknown number of Lendu civilians in villages in the Djugu region close to the concessions claimed by the Hema-Gegere farmers. Villages in the Dz’na Buba, Linga, Jiba, Dhendo, Blukwa Mbi, Laudjo, Laudedjo Gokpa, Nyalibati and Gbakulu groupements were particularly badly affected. Most of the victims were Lendu but Hema were also killed during the attacks. Numerous victims died when their village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes. Some victims were shot dead at point-blank range.

• On September 14, 1999, during a night-time offensive on the village of Fataki, in the Walendu Djatsi community, members of the Hema militias and Hema soldiers from the APC killed several tens of civilians with edged weapons, including at least 15 minors and several women. The assailants then buried the bodies themselves. Following the attack, all the Lendu left the village and Fataki became a Hema bastion in the Walendu Djatsi community.

• During the months that followed, members of the Lendu militias tried to regain control of Fataki on several occasions. For its part, the UPDF concentrated its troops on Fataki and Linga and led several offensives against Lendu militia bases in Kpandroma and Rethy, in the Walendu Djatsi community.

• In November 1999, the Ugandan President,Yoweri Museveni, who is from the Hima (or Hema?) tribe, met representatives of the Ituri communities.

• On December 1, 1999, members of the Lendu militias confronted elements of the UPDF and members of the Hema militias over control of the mining town of Bambou, in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu region. The fighting allegedly led to the deaths of over 200 members of the civilian population. Numerous victims were mutilated and the town looted. Most of the victims’ bodies were thrown into the River Chari.

• On April 26, 2000, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops attacked the Buba groupement, in the Walendu Pitsi community, causing around 10 deaths, the majority of whom were Lendu civilians.

Hutus against Tutsis, Tutsis against Hutus, Hemas with the help of fellow tribesmen from Uganda, Tutsis with the help of fellow tribesmen from Rwanda. This is just about a ordinary, decades-long war among tribes under the pretext of "national security." whereby Hema tribesman Yowori Museveni from Uganda seeks dominance on the other side of his tribal territory, and Tutsi tribesman, Paul Kagame from Rwanda seeks to expand his territory for minerals in the DRC..

Paul Kagame was born into a Tutsi family in southern Rwanda that fled to Uganda when he was two years old. He spent the rest of his childhood there during the Rwandan Revolution, which ended Tutsi political dominance.

In the 1980s, Kagame fought in Yoweri Museveni's rebel army becoming a senior Ugandan army officer after many military victories led Museveni to the Ugandan presidency. Kagame joined the RPF, taking control of the rebel group when the previous leader Fred Rwigyema died on the second day of the 1990 invasion

By 1993, the RPF controlled significant territory in Rwanda and a ceasefire was negotiated. The assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana set off the genocide, in which Hutu extremists killed an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Kagame resumed the civil war and ended the genocide with a military victory.

The genocide is the worst example of tribalism in politics in black Africa's history.

Rwanda has only known four presidents. Paul Kagame made an end to fair elections 25 years ago, on April 22, 2000. Since 2003, he has been "re-elected" time and time again as elections are manipulated in various ways. Manipulations include banning opposition parties, arresting or assassinating critics, and electoral fraud. According to its constitution, Rwanda is a multi-party democracy with a presidential system. In practice, it functions as a one-party state ruled by the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its leader Paul Kagame.

Like Kagame, Yorowi Museveni, Uganda's long sit-tight dictator has a militant background as he was a Front for National Salvation member. In Uganda, nine people who have ruled the country were military officers. In 1981, Yoweri Museveni carried out a coup against the then-dictatorship of Milton Obote. The first elections under Museveni's government were held on May 9, 1996. He was sworn in as president for the second time on May 12, 1996, and remained in power since then. In 2004, the government proposed to amend the Constitution to enable Museveni to rule for life.

Like the Rwandan constitution, the  Ugandan constitution doesn't reflect reality. In the Political Parties And Organizations Act 2005, it is to read: " Every citizen of Uganda has a right to form or join a political party or organization of his or her choice." and "The people shall express their will and consent on who shall govern them and how they should be governed, through regular, free and fair elections ..." Well, the case of Bobby Wine has proven that even Uganda is defacto a one-party state.

Bertrand Bisimwa is the 'president' of the rebel group 'March 23' (M23), and Emmanuel Sultan Makenga the military chief. Bisimwa stood alongside Nangaa at the launch of AFC and is central to AFC and M23's collaboration.

On January 1, 2025 and during an interview with Al Jazeera, Bisimwa claimed that he was fighting a "defensive" war. The Qatari broadcast was punished for the interview and banned from reporting in the DR Congo for nine months.

However, a background check learns that Bisimwa is since April 2012 the head of the militia group while the Rwandan ruler, Paul Kagame is destablizing the North Kivu province over minerals since 2004 .

It is in 2012 that the M23 first saw action during its first rebellion against the Congolese government that led to the displacement of large numbers of people.

A United Nations report found that Rwanda (read: Kagame) created and commanded the M23 rebel group. Rwanda ceased its support due to international pressure and the military defeat by the Congolese military and the UN peacekeeping forces in 2013.

In June 2024, up to 4.000 Rwandan troops have secretly crossed the border into North Kivu province. A year later, the Guardian reported that hundreds of Rwandan troops had been killed during covert operations in the province contradicting claims by Kagame that his soldiers are not involved in the conflict there.

An X-post reads: "On 5th/2/2025, RDF terrorist appointed Manzi Ngarambe Willy, a Rwandan by nationality, & a cousin to ICC-convicted war criminal Bosco Ntaganda, alias  Terminator, as Vice Governor of North Kivu in charge of administration. Previously, he was RDF-M23's Diaspora Chief Coordinator."

Rwanda, that means its sit-tight dictator Paul Kagame, have systematically claimed that it is about "national security" However, over the course of his 20 years-long adversaries in the east of the Democractic Republic of the Congo, he was constantly referring and hinting to the genocide of Tutsis in 1994 while ignoring the genocide of Hutis in the same period..  We found this kind of politics similar to those of the Israelis who systematically refer to the holocaust while ignoring thousands of  people of other groups who died in Nazi concentration camps, and the genocide of Palestinians during the Nakba of 1948.

Kagame, who is a Tutsi, has been accused time and time again of being behind the mutiny of Tutsi soldiers in April 2012 based in North Kivu. In fact, he has been accused of being behind the forming of M23 that same year to seek control over untapped resources in the eastof the DR. Congo..

The Democratic Republic of Congo is considered the world's richest country in terms of wealth in natural resources. Most of the raw mineral deposits remain untapped and are worth an estimated $24 trillion. These deposits include the world's largest coltan reserves and considerable amounts of cobalt. The price of coltan depends on how much tantalum it contains, but on average, a kilogram of the rare ore fetches $48, according to Forbes in January 2024.

WHAT IS COLTAN USED FOR?

Coltan (short for columbite–tantalites and known industrially as tantalite) is a dull black metallic ore from which the elements niobium and tantalum are extracted. The niobium-dominant mineral in coltan is columbite (after niobium's original American name columbium), and the tantalum-dominant mineral is tantalite.

Tantalum from coltan is used to manufacture tantalum capacitors which are used for mobile phones, personal computers, automotive electronics, and cameras. Coltan mining is widespread in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

WHAT IS COBALT USED FOR?

Cobalt is a chemical element; it has the symbol Co and atomic number 27. As with nickel, cobalt is found in the Earth's crust only in a chemically combined form, save for small deposits found in alloys of natural meteoric iron. The free element, produced by reductive smelting, is a hard, lustrous, somewhat brittle,  gray metal.

Cobalt-based blue pigments (cobalt blue) have been used since antiquity for jewelry and paints, and to impart a distinctive blue tint to glass. The color was long thought to be due to the metal bismuth. Miners had long used the name kobold ore (German for goblin ore) for some of the blue pigment-producing minerals. They were so named because they were poor in known metals and gave off poisonous arsenic-containing fumes when smelted

Cobalt is primarily used in lithium-ion batteries.

RWANDA

We don't look at political aspects. We look at material aspects. Here are a few examples found in reports mainly from the United Nations Security Council indicating Rwanda's interest in minerals from North Kivu.

• On July 15, 2004, traffic reportedly consisted of military materiel and ammunition, recently recruited Congolese returning from Rwanda for active military.

• On November 15, 2012, Border officials and former M23 soldiers repeatedly witnessed the arrival of Rwandan troops into North Kivu from Rwanda

• BBC on July 30, 2024, The Democratic Republic of Congo accused the Rwandan army of jamming satellite navigation systems affecting civilian flights in the conflict-hit east of the country.

• On December 27, 2024, Rwanda jams air traffic in the DRC.

• On January 29, 2025, the director of the UN peacekeeping missions, Jean-Pierre Lacroix said "There was no question that there are Rwandan troops in Goma supporting the M23,"

CHINA

• On April 14, 2021, Chinese machine factory, Forui Machinery posted a video of a tantalum-niobium ore beneficiation installation it had delivered to Rwanda.

• In 2022, the Observatory of Economic Complexity reported that the Democratic Republic of the Congo exported Cobalt worth $5.74B

• On June 4, 2024, the UNSC reported the presence of a landing strip in Rwanda close to the border with DRC's North Kivu.

• On October 27, 2024, the French RFI reported that Chinese-owned firms were mining gold in North Kivu often without permits and without declaring the mineral when brought into Rwanda.

CONSUMERS

As consumers, we all are part of the conflict because our homes are filled with tantalum, and carry it in our mobile phones, and smartwatches. Some people even have tantalum in their jewelry.

However, we are at the end of the chain. So, we all don't feel guilty because we think it's not created by us. We as consumers contribute to the war by always wanting the newest and or better versions without asking ourselves what's inside, what is it made of, and where the material comes from to make it.

It is not in our collective buying behavior to be critical and it is also not what manufacturers want to see. Producing, selling and making money is what it is all about, not human lives. Hence the indifference among buyers and sellers.

The unchanged collective behavior among consumers naturally raises the question "Is a change in this behavior possible?"

A change is always possible if there is a will and that has not been the case for years because of advertising campaigns to keep everyone buying. It is about a vicious circle of supply and demand.

However, how often do manufacturers come up with "innovations" that the consumer has not asked for? You see this every year in the mobile phone industry, for example.

• The timeline is exemplary as it does not contain all developments you may wish to see listed, including efforts made by the fighting sides.
• The views expressed in the content of each article are solely those of the source and may not or do not reflect the reality as having occured as dated below.
• Be aware that most disinformation are published by Rwandan and Ugandan sources, including the Rwandan The New Times, which is a state outlet since the aftermath of the 1990s genocicde. It is accused of exploiting the genocicde and resorting to tribalism in its way of "reporting"

• The timeline is exemplary as it does not contain all developments you may wish to see listed, including efforts made by the fighting sides.
• The views expressed in the content of each article are solely those of the source and may not or do not reflect the reality as having occured as dated below.
• Be aware that most disinformation are published by Rwandan and Ugandan sources, including the Rwandan The New Times, which is a state outlet since the aftermath of the 1990s genocicde. It is accused of exploiting the genocicde and resorting to tribalism in its way of "reporting"

• The timeline is exemplary as it does not contain all developments you may wish to see listed, including efforts made by the fighting sides.
• The views expressed in the content of each article are solely those of the source and may not or do not reflect the reality as having occured as dated below.
• Be aware that most disinformation are published by Rwandan and Ugandan sources, including the Rwandan The New Times, which is a state outlet since the aftermath of the 1990s genocicde. It is accused of exploiting the genocicde and resorting to tribalism in its way of "reporting"

• The timeline is exemplary as it does not contain all developments you may wish to see listed, including efforts made by the fighting sides.
• The views expressed in the content of each article are solely those of the source and may not or do not reflect the reality as having occured as dated below.
• Be aware that most disinformation are published by Rwandan and Ugandan sources, including the Rwandan The New Times, which is a state outlet since the aftermath of the 1990s genocicde. It is accused of exploiting the genocicde and resorting to tribalism in its way of "reporting"

This summary is not completed yet.

• The timeline is exemplary as it does not contain all developments you may wish to see listed, including efforts made by the fighting sides.
• The views expressed in the content of each article are solely those of the source and may not or do not reflect the reality as having occured as dated below.
• Be aware that most disinformation are published by Rwandan and Ugandan sources, including the Rwandan The New Times, which is a state outlet since the aftermath of the 1990s genocicde. It is accused of exploiting the genocicde and resorting to tribalism in its way of "reporting"

Note: Rwanda is demanding around $64 million from London for a scrapped migrant deportation deal. The agreement, signed under the previous Conservative government, aimed to deport asylum seekers from Britain to Rwanda. However, before the plan could be implemented, Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer declared it dead upon taking office last year. Rwanda has stated it will not return the funds already received. The demand comes as Kigali criticizes the UK's aid cut over the DRC conflict, calling it a "breach of trust" and "punitive," while pointing to the abandoned agreement.

VOA

Rwanda has expressed deep concerns over the ongoing security crisis in eastern DR Congo, telling the visiting European Union (EU) Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Ambassador Johan Borgstam, that regional stability is at risk due to the presence of hostile forces near its borders. Sanctioned Kabarebe even dares to say: “Our sovereignty has been violated more than 20 times since 2018. Rwanda cannot sit back while these threats persist, and our defensive measures will remain in place until they are fully addressed.”

Pages

• AFC/M23 conquered Rubaya, which has the largest coltan mine in the Great Lakes region. AFC/M23 established a parallel administration controlling mining  activities, trade, transport and the taxation of minerals produced. At least 150 tons of coltan were fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the Great Lakes region recorded to date.

• This resolution authorised MONUSCO to provide logistical and operational support to SAMIDRC and requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution and SAMIDRC to report on its activities, including coordination with MONUSCO, by 15 November.

• Heavy fighting continued between M23, alongside the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) together with the Wazalendo coalition of local armed groups, the sanctioned Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Burundi National Defence Force troops. Private military companies and troops of the Southern African Development Community, which were deployed in December 2023, provided operational and military support to FARDC.

• Evidence of direct interventions by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) on Democratic Republic of the Congo territory, either to reinforce M23 combatants or to conduct military operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and local armed groups. The Group identified several RDF commanders and officials coordinating RDF operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• This resolution extends the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO

• This is the Security Council's Presidential Statement on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

• The resolution extends the 1533 DRC sanctions regime until July 1, 2024 and the mandate of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee until August 1, 2024.

• This was a presidential statement adopted by the Security Council following its visiting mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which took place between March 9 and 12, 2023.

• (a) direct intervention of the Rwandan Defence Force on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, either to reinforce M23/ARC or to conduct military operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR);
• (b) provision of weapons, ammunition and uniforms to M23/ARC;
• (c) support to several Congolese armed groups by FARDC members in Rutshuru territory; and
• (d) cooperation between FARDC units and Congolese armed groups in Rutshuru territory. Attacks against peacekeepers, torture and inhuman treatment, deliberate killings and indiscriminate shelling of civilians were also documented and constitute sanctionable acts. M23/ARC imposed taxes on goods and individuals in the areas under its control, including at the Bunagana border crossing with Uganda.

• Criminal networks and some FARDC members continued to traffic in and profit from untagged coltan from mines in Masisi territory, and from tourmaline from the Rukaza mine, also in Masisi territory. Some of these mines were subject to armed attack and some of the minerals were smuggled into Rwanda for onward trade.

• Violent clashes between armed groups, involving mainly Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) factions and Collectif des mouvements pour le changement (CMC) combatants, continued in Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and southern Lubero territories and resulted in shifting alliances and serious abuses against civilians. FARDC continued to use the Bwira faction as a proxy to fight some armed groups. FARDC and the Bwira faction collaborated to exploit gold at the Matungu mine.
• Illicit activities in the tin, tantalum and tungsten sectors continued.
• Armed clashes at mines around Rubaya during 2020 and fraud at coltan mines in the area, raising concerns about the effectiveness of government and private sector efforts to address those issues.

• Criminal networks were involved in the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten originating from mine sites under armed group occupation. Tantalum was the most confiscated of the three minerals at the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda border between January and September 2020.
• The Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple Congolais (URDPC/CODECO) and the Armée de libération du Congo (ALC/CODECO) used children, a sanctionable act. Some FARDC members deployed in Ituri committed exactions against Lendu civilians.

• Congolese gold sector remained vulnerable to exploitation by armed groups and criminal networks and to unregulated trading. The volumes of smuggled gold were significantly higher than the volumes of legally traded gold.
• Congolese gold traced to regional refineries and other international destinations. Some refineries acted as brokers, used cash payments, undertook refiner-to-refiner trading and used corporate networks to obscure ownership, thereby inhibiting supply chain accountability. Gold traders also avoided the use of formal banking networks.
• Combatants from NDC-R, led by sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033), and from CMC/FDP, led by Ndaruhutse Kamanzi Dominique, also known as Domi, committed widespread conflict-related sexual violence amidst recurrent combat operations in Masisi and Rutshuru territories from January 2019 to February 2020.
• Mai-Mai Malaika combatants led by Sheikh Hassani committed multiple abuses in Salamabila since at least 2018.

• Armed groups including NDC-R, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and Nyatura factions, criminal networks and some members of the Congolese security forces were involved in the illicit production of and trade in minerals, in some cases facilitated by financial networks.
• Potential violations of the arms embargo and non-compliance on the part of supplier States with the requirement to notify to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) in advance of the delivery of arms, related military equipment and provision of training.

• Regulations in the artisanal and small-scale gold sector were either incomplete or poorly enforced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
• Smuggling and underdeclaration continued in Bukavu and Butembo, for onward delivery through Bujumbura, Kigali and Kampala to Dubai.
• Armed groups continued to finance their activities through the illegal mining of tin (cassiterite), tantalum (coltan) and tungsten (wolframite), thereby contaminating the supply chain.
• Cases of smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten involving criminal networks using various tactics, as well as specific instances in which some Congolese government officials were involved in the diversion of minerals.
• Cases of violations of the arms embargo and non-compliance by supplier States with the requirement to notify the Security Council Committee.

• A well-established international network uncovered dedicated to the recruitment of combatants sent to Beni territory.
• Arms and ammunition used by an armed group active in Fizi and Uvira territories and associated with Rwandan opposition groups, were transferred from Burundi.
• A faction of the Raia Mutomboki group in Shabunda territory,  profit from the exploitation and trade of natural resources. FARDC elements were the main armed actors involved in mining tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold in Shabunda territory. Tin, tantalum and tungsten sourced from areas controlled by armed actors were introduced into the formal supply chain with the authorization of authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda remained an important transit hub for gold illegally sourced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including from Shabunda territory.

• Armed groups and criminal networks, including national security officers, continued to use gold and taxation as sources of illegal revenue.
• In Bunia and Bukavu, gold sourced in high-risk and conflict areas was exported illegally to Uganda and Rwanda.
• Smuggling activities in the tin, tantalum and tungsten sector continued to represent an obstacle to the successful implementation of due diligence measures.

• Causes deforestation:  FDLR maintained alliances with Congolese armed groups and continued to generate revenues by selling charcoal and wooden planks produced inside Virunga National Park.
• The Allied Democratic Forces continued to recruit from Uganda.
• Documentation of attempted smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten involving an officer from the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, as well as breaches of the tin, tantalum and tungsten mineral traceability system.
• Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that it had taken action in relation to the disappearance of 50 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region export certificates from its national stock, it has yet to provide information on the whereabouts of most of the certificates.

• The implementation of mineral traceability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has considerably reduced instances of armed groups directly benefiting from the exploitation and trade of tin, tantalum and tungsten. In addition, opportunities for indirect benefits from such minerals are decreasing.
• International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates are being used in a fraudulent manner to export gold to Dubai, the main recipient of artisanally sourced gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
• Kampala remains the main transit hub for gold smuggled out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
• A network of Congolese and Burundian nationals, including elements of the Forces de défense nationale (FDN) of Burundi, was involved in arms trafficking in Uvira, South Kivu Province.

• The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continued to operate in Beni territory and recruited nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.
• Challenges in fully implementing due diligence in the tin, tantalum and tungsten sector remain a threat to the positive developments noted in previous reports. While traceability and certification processes are expanding, armed actors do occasionally interfere in sites certified as conflict free.
• In Beni territory, a massacre in Rwangoma in August 2016.
• Armed members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition crossed into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• Foreign armed groups from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda continued to operate in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda remain the largest armed group in the country, although
  seriously destabilized by operations carried out by FARDC and Mai Mai groups in 2015.
• Many Congolese armed elements were involved in criminal networks and banditry rather than structured armed groups, which caused similar levels of insecurity, but is more difficult to combat with traditional military operations.
• Some FARDC elements were extensively involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources, especially through the taxation of miners.
• Armed groups also continue to generate significant revenue from the control, taxation or looting of natural resources, especially gold, but also tin, tantalum, tungsten, charcoal and timber.
• Armed groups were still using children in 2015 and early in 2016, and mass killings were carried out by a range of armed elements in both southern Lubero and Beni territory in North Kivu province.

• In the period from October 2014 to June 2015, between 350 and 450 civilians were killed in the Beni area, in North Kivu Province, in at least 50 separate incidents.
• Natural resources continue to be trafficked illegally, and armed groups and some FARDC officers are still benefiting from the exploitation and taxation of the resources. Mineral tracing tags conceived to ensure the traceability of minerals continue to be sold on the black market in Rwanda, which can allow minerals sourced in conflict areas in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to enter the international market.
• Armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to recruit and use children.

• ADF, FDLR, Nduma Defence for Congo (led by sanctioned individual Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi) and other armed groups continued to recruit, train and use child soldiers in 2014.
• Armed groups also committed a variety of other abuses, including torture, enslavement and sexual violence.
• There were mass killings in June in Mutarule (South Kivu) and in October and November in Beni territory (North Kivu).
• Smuggling of minerals produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues.
• There was virtually no progress in addressing gold smuggling in 2014 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, and scant evidence of interest in traceability and due diligence by those Governments or by the Government of the United Arab Emirates.
• Burundi failed to notify the Security Council Committee about the deployment of the Burundian army (Force de défense
  nationale, FDN) in South Kivu.

• In contrast to claims that it is ready to disarm, FDLR continues to recruit and train combatants, including children.
• Progress has been slow in resolving the fate of the ex-combatants and political cadres of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) in Rwanda and Uganda. Several problems have emerged, including members of M23 escaping from camps in Rwanda, increased numbers and evidence of reorganization among M23 members in Uganda and the absence of important M23 officers from lists of M23 members in Uganda.
• The Democratic Republic of the Congo has a mine validation system, through which it inspects sites and authorizes mining activity. This has enabled exports of tin and tantalum from the Kivus, but the lack of validation in other regions, such as Ituri district, is preventing companies from legally exporting. This encourages the continuation of smuggling through neighbouring States.

• Armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have derived funding from the production of and trade in natural resources.
• Many gold mining sites in post-conflict areas blends production from these areas with production from conflict areas, particularly in the larger trading towns in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the transit countries of Burundi, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.
• Armed groups and FARDC continue to control many mining sites and to profit from mining and the minerals trade. During
  2013, minerals — particularly tin, tungsten and tantalum — continued to be smuggled from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo through neighbouring countries.

• Group visited the Provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu.
• Group conducted two official visits to Uganda, two official visits to Rwanda and an official visit to Burundi.
• Group conducted official visits to Belgium, Germany, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States.

• Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The de facto chain of command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe.
• Senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and facilitation of external relations. Units of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces jointly supported M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Congolese armed forces base of Rumangabo.
• The use and recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups, notably by M23, has increased.
• Some M23 commanders have ordered the extrajudicial executions of dozens of recruits and prisoners of war

• Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda

• Since April 2011, most tin, tantalum and tungsten comptoirs in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have had no buyers for untagged minerals, with
  the exception of three — TTT Mining, Huaying Tradinga and Donson International — which have sold to smelters, refiners and trading companies in China that do not
  require tags or evidence of due diligence. The Group has evidence that these comptoirs have made purchases that finance armed groups and criminal networks within FARDC. Since Chinese refiners, smelters and trading companies make up a significant proportion of the buyers of tin, tungsten and particularly tantalum from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, awareness and implementation of due diligence on the part of such companies are of particular importance.

• Congolese gold is much in demand. Most of the gold trade in the country goes unrecorded, and most transactions are concluded in neighbouring cities such as Kampala (Uganda), Bujumbura (Burundi), Nairobi (Kenya) or Mwanza (United Republic of Tanzania).

• Substantial discrepancies found of more than three tons, between gold import statistics provided by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates and those exports claimed by the Government of Uganda.

• During the ban imposed on September 11, 2010, the mining of tin, coltan and wolframite had continued in several areas, often under the control of FARDC or armed groups.

• Smuggling of minerals can pass unrecorded through official crossings, but most smugglers use illegal border crossings. A number of such crossings has been identified, including a street controlled by General Bosco Ntaganda in Goma and a small Lake Kivu port north of Bukavu run by elements of the FARDC navy. Smugglers sometimes try to launder untagged material into the International Tin Research Institute Tin Supply Chain Initiative in Rwanda, threatening the credibility of the system.

• Armed groups continue to obtain most of their arms, ammunition and uniforms from FARDC. Leakage from FARDC stocks, whether through small-scale barter, larger transactions, abandonment or seizure on the battlefield, is widespread and largely uncontrolled. State-owned arms are not yet marked or registered before being issued.

• President Joseph Kabila has publicly recognized that the involvement of criminal networks within the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in the illegal exploitation of natural resources has created a conflict of interest with the army’s constitutional security mandate.

• Units of the former Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) in FARDC have gained military control over most of the strategic areas rich in natural resources in the Kivus

• Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003

• Between June and December 1999, UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Forces) and APC soldiers killed an unknown number of Lendu civilians in villages in the Djugu region close to the concessions claimed by the Hema-Gegere farmers. Villages in the Dz’na Buba, Linga, Jiba, Dhendo, Blukwa Mbi, Laudjo, Laudedjo Gokpa, Nyalibati and Gbakulu groupements were particularly badly affected. Most of the victims were Lendu but Hema were also killed during the attacks. Numerous victims died when their village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes. Some victims were shot dead at point-blank range.

• On September 14, 1999, during a night-time offensive on the village of Fataki, in the Walendu Djatsi community, members of the Hema militias and Hema soldiers from the APC killed several tens of civilians with edged weapons, including at least 15 minors and several women. The assailants then buried the bodies themselves. Following the attack, all the Lendu left the village and Fataki became a Hema bastion in the Walendu Djatsi community.

• During the months that followed, members of the Lendu militias tried to regain control of Fataki on several occasions. For its part, the UPDF concentrated its troops on Fataki and Linga and led several offensives against Lendu militia bases in Kpandroma and Rethy, in the Walendu Djatsi community.

•  In November 1999, the Ugandan President,Yoweri Museveni, met representatives of the Ituri communities.

• On December 1, 1999, members of the Lendu militias confronted elements of the UPDF and members of the Hema militias over control of the mining town of Bambou, in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu region. The fighting allegedly led to the deaths of over 200 members of the civilian population. Numerous victims were mutilated and the town looted. Most of the victims’ bodies were thrown into the River Chari.

• On April 26, 2000, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops attacked the Buba groupement, in the Walendu Pitsi community, causing around 10 deaths, the majority of whom were Lendu civilians.

• Investigation on FDLR's exploitation of natural resources in the Kivus, notably gold and cassiterite reserves. Their networks are tightly intertwined with trading networks operating within Uganda and Burundi as well as in the United Arab Emirates.

• CNDP military officers deployed as part of FARDC Kimia II operations have profited from their deployment in mineral-rich areas, notably at the Bisie mine in Walikale, North Kivu, and in the territory of Kalehe, in South Kivu. In both these areas, the FARDC commanding officers on the ground are former CNDP officers.  CNDP military officials in the supply of minerals to a number of exporting houses in North and South Kivu.

• Continued diversion of FARDC military equipment to non-governmental armed groups, notably FDLR includes irregular deliveries of arms to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the Democratic Peopleís Republic of Korea and the Sudan.

• FARDC and non-governmental armed groups continue to perpetrate human rights abuses.

• Investigation on individuals who have committed violations of international humanitarian law by targeting women and children, who have impeded the disarmament process, and who have recruited child soldiers.

• Investigation on arms shipments to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of which exporting countries have failed to notify the Security Council Committee.

• Examination ofd the link between natural resources and the financing of illegal armed groups.

• According to FARDC and CNDP officers and local administrative officials, the Congress, after capturing a stock of between 15 and 20 tons of weapons and ammunition from the FARDC 15th brigade in Kikuku in December 2007, defeated several brigades of FARDC troops in Mushaki, capturing stocks of FARDC weapons and ammunition from the 14th and 81st brigades. The Group is investigating allegations that the capture of these stocks took place with the complicity of FARDC brigade officers.

• Investigation into the degree of support CNDP is receiving from the Government of Rwanda. The Congress continues to recruit in Rwanda, although mostly from the Rwandan civilian population and demobilized combatants of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), and to a reduced extent from the Congolese refugee camps in Byumba and Kibuye.

• According to interviews with a high-ranking CNDP deserter and a Congolese intelligence official, in December 2007 Colonel Jules Mutebutsi was sighted at Runyoni, on the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, close to the CNDP training camp at Chanzo run by Colonel Makenga, with dozens of Congolese soldiers who had been in Mutebutsi’s camp in Gikongoro, Rwanda. According to the CNDP deserter, who was an eyewitness, the Congolese soldiers were armed and transported in RDF trucks.

• Border region between Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo: according to local churches and NGOs, many recruits allegedly cross the border through the Runyoni area on the slopes of the Sabinyo volcano, from where they enter directly into the CNDP training camp at Chanzo.

• According to interviews with business leaders, administration officials, MONUC and CNDP deserters, CNDP is supported and financed by wealthy individuals based in Goma and Rwanda, including some owners of mineralexporting companies based in the city of Goma and owners of large plots of land in areas controlled by CNDP in North Kivu

• Case studies on illegal armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

  • 37. The first two case studies concern the illegal armed groups that pose the most serious threat to peace and security in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, FDLR-FOCA and the military wing of CNDP. Both case studies focus on the command structure of the illegal armed groups, their arms supplies, financing sources, cross-border recruitment and violations of international law regarding the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. The remaining case studies concern violations of the arms embargo by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Member States supplying arms to the Government

• Requests for information regarding the transit of precious and semi-precious materials and stones from the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been addressed to Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania. No information has been provided in response to those requests.

• Request for information on civil aviation from Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Moldova, São Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Ukraine. While Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Moldova and Sierra Leone have not conveyed any information to the Group, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tome and Principe and Ukraine have provided partial responses. Ukraine has not yet provided the serial numbers and identities of the proprietors of certain Antonov airplanes, São Tome and Principe has not responded to the request for a visit by the Group, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has yet to provide registration data on all airplanes currently operating within its territory.

• Frequently contacting manufacturers and suppliers of arms and ammunition to request the information needed to identify the point of diversion of material from the licit to the illicit supply chain. Requests made include those for technical details and tracing information. Of the 17 requests only the United States has responded.

• Requests for assistance concerning embargoed material captured by or transferred to FARDC, as well as access to FARDC personnel for interviews, have been conveyed to the Congolese authorities but there has been no response.

• Outstanding requests for information addressed to the Governments of Angola and Belgium that date back to previous mandates of the Group. These include the absence of an official response to a request conveyed in a number of e-mails and following meetings held with the Belgian authorities from 22 to 24 May 2006 in connection with the attempted sale of pyrochlor by individuals based in and operating from Belgium. A request to the Government of Angola concerning a transfer of military material, cited in a previous report of the Group also remains unanswered.

• In Ituri and the Kivus there has been a clear geographical correlation between the activities of illicit armed actors and areas of natural resource exploitation. Control over territory has proven to be the key factor enabling armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to profit from the exploitation of natural resources.

• Internal documentation of the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistesFront de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri (FNI-FRPI) obtained by the Group of Experts during the mandate of Security Council resolution 1616 (2005) demonstrated the predominance of the gold mining sector as this group’s main source of income.

• The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) now have control over many of those areas where natural resource exploitation is taking place. In terms of taxation, theft and abuses of the small-scale mining community, there are striking similarities between the illicit activities of the 85th Brigade related to cassiterite (tin oxide) production in Walikale and gold production controlled by FNI-FRPI in Mongbwalu.

• FARDC arms supplied to rebels of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

• Enquiry into the theft of FARDC ammunition in the Bunia region.

• Arrest of a Burundi citizen.

• Arms are continuing to enter the country through ever-porous borders. The lack of border surveillance and the easy access to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Great Lakes region make it difficult to prevent entries and to intercept arms and military materiel.

• Lack of centralized information on the inventories has a detrimental impact on the provision of new supplies for the troops.

• Uganda did not give permission for a visit to the arms and ammunition factory at Nakasongola, despite the repeated requests made by the Group in the context of earlier mandates.

• Integrated seventh brigade of FARDC, located in the Kitona brassage centre, received arms and military materiel from the Angolan authorities.

• Request for information to the civil aviation administrations in various countries, notably the Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, from which companies had ferried arms to African Great Lake countries.

• Request for information to Baseops International, a firm that assists airlines with flight preparation and provides supplies for their aircraft this firm to provide flight plans with which it had assisted in the case of aircraft travelling to or from any Great Lakes country. This enterprise refused to provide the information requested on the grounds of client confidentiality.

• Tripoli and Benghazi (Libya) favoured transit points for aircraft carrying arms and ammunition, particularly to the Great Lakes countries.

• Silverback Cargo Freighters, a Rwandan air-cargo company; Kosmas Air, a Serbian freight company; Bright Aviation Services Ltd (Bulgaria); JSC Aircompany Euro-Asia Air, based in Aturay (Kazakhstan); Reem Air Airlines, a Kyrgyzstan airline company;  Vega Airlines Ltd., a Bulgarian air-cargo company; Emco Ltd., an arms manufacturer and broker;

• Bulgaria permitted the exportation of 5,000 AK47s to Rwanda

• Request for documents identifying the exact nature of arms shipments imported by the Transitional Government, as well as the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda since the beginning of the embargo. These documents have not been provided.

• Investigation into a internal transfer of ammunition and related military materiel by General Pacifique Masunzu.

•  Tracing requests regarding 4,000 firearms were sent to the countries of manufacture. The tracing requests asked those States to provide information from the manufacturers’ records, as well as recent exportations involving the firearms.

• Inadequate access to in-country air transportation and time pressures prevented further investigation into these allegations.

• The border between Ituri and Uganda remains porous. The extent to which armed groups receive logistical support and arms shipments across the border must thus be further investigated. The insufficient control of the airspace of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and landing sites in Ituri and the way in which arms embargo violators profit from this requires ongoing investigation.

• During its inspection of the Ituri border crossings at Aru and Ariwara, the Group found the Government’s authority to be weak and undermined by the overpowering presence of illicit commercial networks with ties to dissident Ituri armed group factions.

• Leaders of Ituri armed groups have repeatedly reneged in the past on commitments to cease military operations, in violation of the embargo.

• In the face of the intransigence of the Ituri armed groups, MONUC adopted a more robust posture in dealing with them.

• Approximately 15,500 combatants from Ituri armed groups have been registered and 6,200 weapons have been surrendered in the disarmament and community reintegration process that officially expired on 31 March 2005.

• Disarmed militiamen reverting to militia activities in reaction to their inability to sustain themselves and their families while awaiting incentives under the disarmament and community reintegration program..

• Various dissident factions of the Ituri armed groups are coalescing and forming new alliances around a commonality of purpose, in opposition to the Transitional Government, FARDC and MONUC.

• Leaders of dissident factions in conjunction with other Congolese dissidents have held operational meetings in Uganda and Rwanda for the purpose of resisting the transition and peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• Detailed information pertaining to meetings between Ugandan Government officials, Ituri armed group leaders and other dissidents, which Uganda claims were for the purpose of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

• In the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many areas suffer from the absence of State authority and hence the extension of law and order. This vacuum permits armed groups and militias in the Ituri District as well as political networks of interlinked commercial and military interests in the Kivu provinces to exercise control over their respective domains.

• Armed groups in the Ituri District and the Kivu provinces continued to receive embargoed material by air.

• The vast number of airfields and the remoteness of many airstrips render adequate detection by the arms embargo monitoring mechanism difficult.

• The aircraft commonly used for these arms transfers are the single-engine Antonov 2 and the twin-engine Antonov 8, Antonov 28 and Antonov 32 aircraft, which are capable of landing on poorly maintained or makeshift runways.

• List of all aircraft registered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as relevant documentation, including registration, airworthiness certificates, insurance certificates and pilots’ credentials, that air companies in the eastern part of the country claimed were in the possession of the Civil Aviation Authority in Kinshasa.

• Embargoed areas continue to be a haven for air transport and air cargo companies operating illicitly inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the endorsement of officials beholden to either Kinshasa, local authorities or foreign Governments.

• Visits to primary airports in the embargoed eastern region, namely those at Bunia, Beni, Butembo, Goma and Bukavu.

• Concerns about aircraft for which flight information had been falsified and that had made undeclared intermediary stops between approved departure and arrival locations

• There are more airstrips than workable roads in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, making it permissible for largely unmonitored internal and international flights.

• The transitional Government exerts little or no authority over extended parts of the eastern border. For instance, in Ituri, cross-border trade is controlled by armed groups that reap substantial benefits, in terms both of tax-generated revenue and easy access to commodities, both licit and illicit, from abroad.

• The porosity, permeability and permissibility of the country’s borders to the east constitute the most critical factor undermining the ability of the transitional Government in Kinshasa and of the international community to monitor the flow of weapons and other illicit commodities into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whether by commercial arms merchants or foreign government suppliers.

• Democratic Republic of the Congo significantly lacks control over both customs and immigration at its 83 formal border posts, of which 27 are in Ituri and the Kivus.

• There is ample opportunity to traffic weapons into the Democratic Republic of the Congo by means of trucks and other vehicles transporting them overland and by individuals and troops carrying them.

• Numerous reports of trucks allegedly ferrying weapons and logistical materiel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the Ugandan border posts of Arua, Paidha and Mpondwe and the Rwandan border posts of Gisenyi and Cyangugu.

• After having assessed numerous ports in Lake Albert, for instance, it has found that local authorities on the Ugandan side, including at Ntoroko, Butiaba and Wanseka, lack basic requirements to aptly monitor trading activities or have formed alliances with leaders of Ituri armed groups and Congolese transporters and traders to create illicit networks for the smuggling of both normal and contraband goods.

• At several lakeside ports in Uganda, the local marine patrol were often found grounded or without sufficient fuel to conduct meaningful patrols.